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Employees with Nothing but Hot Air, 2 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 257 (2006), at
http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v2-1/swatzell.pdf.

INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself as a man in his mid-forties. You and your wife
of the past fifteen years have two children, and you have spent the past
twelve years working as an employee for Blue Star Airlines.1 As an
employee of Blue Star, in addition to earning a salary you participate
in the company’s employee stock ownership plan, which provides you
a small stake in the ownership of the airline. When the company is
successful the stock price rises, so you are able to share in the
company’s success.
During the first ten years that you participated in the plan the
share price of Blue Star stock rose rather consistently. However,
recently the airline industry has fallen on difficult times: the price of
fuel has risen, people are traveling less, and as a result, Blue Star has
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
Yes, this is a thinly veiled reference to Oliver Stone’s masterpiece, WALL
STREET (20th Century Fox 1987).
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been losing money to the point where it appears that bankruptcy is a
real possibility. To make matters worse, a rapid decrease in the share
price of Blue Star stock has made your employee stock ownership plan
practically worthless.
There are approximately ten million employees in the United
States who participate in employee stock ownership plans.2 At the end
of 2004, these plans were estimated to own $600 billion dollars in
assets.3 It’s very likely that you or someone you know participates in
this type of employee benefit plan.4
The hypothetical above is not merely an unfortunate series of
events conceived to make a point – these events actually happened to
many United Airlines’ (“United”) employees only a few years ago.
United suffered massive financial loss in the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, yet it continued to instruct the
trustee managing its employee stock ownership plan to hold on to
United stock.5 When the stock was finally sold, it was practically
worthless.6 The employees who participated in the plan sought
recourse in federal court; however, their claim against the trustee for
breach of its fiduciary duty was ultimately rejected.7
This Comment focuses on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Summers v. State Street Bank & Trust Company.8
Part I discusses the Employee Retirement Income Securities Act
(“ERISA”) and introduces the concepts of employee stock ownership
2

THE ESOP ASSOCIATION
http://www.esopassociation.org/media/media_statistics.asp (last visited November
15, 2006). “The ESOP Association is the national association of companies with
employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and service providers with a professional
commitment to employee ownership through ESOPs.”
3
Id.
4
Employee benefit plans and welfare benefit plans are the subject of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), which is discussed
infra at Part I.
5
See Summers v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 453 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2006).
6
Id. at 408.
7
Id. at 405-11.
8
453 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2006).
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plans and directed trustees. Part II focuses on the U.S. Department of
Labor’s Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2004-03 and its determination of
the fiduciary duties of a directed trustee. Finally, Part III examines the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Summers and concludes that the court
erred when it denied relief to a class of current and former United
employees who asserted an ERISA claim against the directed trustee
of their employee stock ownership plan who had allegedly breached its
fiduciary duty of prudence.
I.

ERISA, ESOPS, AND DIRECTED TRUSTEES

A. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
ERISA9 was enacted “to promote the interests of employees and
their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.”10 It was promulgated
after Congress found “that there had been a rapid and substantial
growth in the size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans and
that the continued well-being and security of millions of employees
and their dependents [were] directly affected by these plans.”11
Therefore, ERISA attempts to ensure that once an employee is
guaranteed a certain benefit by his or her employer, that employee will
receive the benefit.12 The Act protects employees “by establishing
standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of
employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.”13 Although
employers are not required to establish employee benefit plans, if they
choose to create such plans then they must comply with ERISA.14
9

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(2004).
10
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983).
11
Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S.
559, 569 (1985) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
12
Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996).
13
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
14
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496-97 (1996).
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B. The Role of Fiduciaries
Under ERISA, all assets of an employee benefit plan must be held
in trust by one or more trustees.15 Additionally, employee benefit plans
must name one or more fiduciaries, who “have authority to control and
manage the operation and administration of the plan.”16 However, an
individual or entity that is not a “named fiduciar[y],” yet still exercises
some discretionary authority and control over the plan, may still be
considered a fiduciary.17 Under ERISA, a person is a fiduciary of a
plan where:
(i) he exercises any discretionary authority or
discretionary control respecting management of such
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting
management or disposition of its assets;, (ii) he renders
investment advice for a fee or other compensation . . . ,
(iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary
responsibility in the administration of such plan.18
Therefore, an individual or entity that is not a named fiduciary, but
retains a certain level of control over an employee benefit plan, will
have the same duties as a named fiduciary.19
ERISA fiduciaries have certain affirmative duties they must
fulfill, the most basic of which is the duty of loyalty.20 Under ERISA,
fiduciaries are required to “discharge [their] duties with respect to a
15

29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). A “named fiduciary” is a “fiduciary who is named
in the plan instrument, or who, pursuant to a procedure specified in the plan, is
identified as a fiduciary (A) by a person who is an employer of employee
organization with respect to the plan or (B) by such an employee organization acting
jointly.” 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2).
17
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
18
Id.
19
Id. It follows, therefore, that a plan trustee who has authority and control
over plan assets, will be, by definition, a “fiduciary” under ERISA.
20
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
16
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plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries of the
plan” for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to those
participants and their beneficiaries.21 According to the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, a fiduciary is in breach of this duty of
loyalty if, for example, it misleads plan participants or misrepresents
the terms or administration of a plan.22
Coexistent with the duty of loyalty is the duty of care, which is
also commonly referred to as a duty of prudence.23 ERISA fiduciaries
are required to act “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims.”24 The duty of
prudence has been interpreted as “an unwavering duty on an ERISA
[fiduciary] to make decisions with single-minded devotion to a plan’s

21

The duties of a fiduciary are found at 29 U.S.C.§ 1104(a)(1), which states

that:
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and –
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of
an enterprise of a like character and with like aims;
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the
risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly
prudent not to do so; and
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the
plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with
the provisions of [ERISA].”
22
Tegtmeier v. Midwest Operating Eng’rs Pension Trust Fund, 390 F.3d 1040,
1047 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Anweiler v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986,
991 (7th Cir. 1993)).
23
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B); Summers v. State St. Bank & Co., 453 F.3d 404,
406 (7th Cir. 2006).
24
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
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participants and beneficiaries and, in so doing, to act as a prudent
person would act in a similar situation.”25
ERISA not only describes the various duties that attach to
fiduciaries,26 but also holds fiduciaries liable for breach of those
duties. 27 Thus, a participant or beneficiary may bring a civil action
against a fiduciary that “breaches any of the responsibilities,
obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this [title].”28 A
fiduciary that breaches his or her duty
shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and
to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary
which have been made through use of assets of the plan
by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other

25

Craig C. Martin & Elizabeth L. Fine, ERISA Stock Drop Cases: An Evolving
Standard, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 889, 900 (2005) (quoting Morse v. Stanley, 732
F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1984)); see also Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1458 (6th
Cir. 1995).
26
In addition to the duties of loyalty and prudence, ERISA requires fiduciaries
to diversify “the investments of [a] plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses,
unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so.” 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1)(C). As the Fifth Circuit described in Metzler v. Graham
[n]o statute or regulation specifies what constitutes ‘diversifying’
plan investments, but the legislative history provides this guidance:
The degree of investment concentration that would violate this
requirement to diversify cannot be stated as a fixed percentage,
because a fiduciary must consider the facts and circumstances of
each case. The factors to be considered include (1) the purposes of
the plan; (2) the amount of the plan assets; (3) financial and
industrial conditions; (4) the type of investment, whether
mortgages, bonds or shares of stock or otherwise; (5) distribution
as to geographical location; (6) distribution as to industries; (7) the
dates of maturity.
112 F.3d 207, 209 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1280 (1974) as reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5084-85).
27
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
28
Id.
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equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.29
C. Employee Stock Ownership Plans
The plan that was at issue in Summers was a very specific type of
employee benefit plan known as an employee stock ownership plan
(“ESOP” or “ESOPs”).30 An ESOP is an employee benefit plan that is
designed to invest primarily in securities issued by its sponsoring
employer.31 A company that wants to establish an ESOP creates a trust
to which it contributes shares of that employer’s stock, which are the
allocated to individual employee accounts within the trust.32
ESOPs are unique because the general duty to diversify33 “is not
violated by acquisition or holding of . . . qualifying employer
securities.”34 Because the purpose of an ESOP is to invest in a single
stock – that of the sponsoring employer – the duty to diversify simply
does not attach to such plans.35

29

Id.
Summers v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 453 F.3d 404, 405 (7th Cir. 2006).
31
29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6)(A). As ESOP is one example of a special ERISA
plan known as “eligible independent account plans (“EIAPs”). An EIAP is an
individual account plan which is also a profit sharing, stock bonus, thrift, or savings
plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(3)(A).
32
THE ESOP ASSOCIATION.
http://www.esopassociation.org/about/about_work.asp (last visited November 16,
2006). A number of different formulas may be used for allocation. The most
common is allocation in proportion to compensation, but formulas allocating stock
according to years of service, some combination of compensation and years of
service, and equally, have all been used.
33
See supra note 26.
34
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2).
35
Summers, 453 F.3d at 406. Had the duty to diversify attached to State Street,
the directed Trustee in Summers, plaintiffs could have easily argued a breach of that
duty. However, because the plan at issue was an ESOP, the duty did not attach.
30
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D. “Directed” Trustees
State Street Bank & Trust Company, the defendant-appellees in
Summers, was what is commonly referred to as a “directed trustee” of
United’s plan.36 The term “directed trustee” is not found within the
language of ERISA; however, it is often used to describe plan trustees
that “are subject to the direction of a named fiduciary who is not a
trustee.”37 Courts have relied on this language to determine that
ERISA permits directed trustees.38
However, the provisions of ERISA that govern the conduct of
directed trustees are, in some ways, difficult to reconcile. Clearly a
directed trustee is deprived of discretion to manage and control plan
assets – by definition, it must follow the direction of a named
fiduciary.39 However, a directed trustee does have responsibility over
assets held in an ERISA plan, which would seem to make such a
trustee a fiduciary.40 Moreover, a directed trustee is obliged to follow
only those directions of a named fiduciary “which are made in
accordance with the terms of the plan and which are not contrary to
[ERISA].”41
This language has created some confusion regarding the existence
and precise scope of a directed trustee’s duty of prudence. Some
federal courts have held that a directed trustee is simply not a plan
36

Id.
29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).
38
See e.g., Summers, 453 F.3d at 406. 29 U.S.C. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1)
provides that if a “plan expressly provides that the trustee or trustees are subject to
the direction of a named fiduciary who is not a trustee … [that trustee] shall be
subject to proper directions of such fiduciary which are made in accordance with the
terms of the plan and which are not contrary to [ERISA].”
39
29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). Furthermore, under 29 U.S.C. § 1105(b)(3)(B), a
directed trustee cannot be held liable for “following instructions referred to in
section [1103(a)(1).”
40
See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
41
29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1); Summers, 453 F.3d at 406 (“An imprudent direction
cannot be a proper direction since the trustee has an express statutory duty of
prudence.”).
37
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fiduciary and therefore does not have a duty of prudence.42 For
example, in Maniace v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City,43 the Eighth
Circuit held that a directed trustee was not a fiduciary, and that
therefore “no fiduciary duties were [owed]” to the plan or its
participants.44 The court reasoned that because the directed trustee
could act only at the direction of a named fiduciary, the directed
trustee had no discretion, and therefore could not be a fiduciary under
the plan.45 The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in
Herman v. NationsBank Trust Company,46 where it held that “insofar
as a trustee acts at the direction of a named fiduciary in accordance
with the terms of the plan and ERISA’s requirements, he is not subject
to the fiduciary requirement . . . to act prudently.”47
However, other courts have held a directed trustee is a fiduciary,
and therefore is subject to the duty of prudence.48 Prior to its decision
in Maniace, the Eighth Circuit held in FirsTier Bank, N.A. v. Zeller49
that simply because a trustee is subject to direction; i.e., is a directed
trustee, the trustee’s fiduciary duties are not eliminated.50 In In re
Worldcom, Inc. ERISA Litigation,51 the district court for the Southern
District of New York held that although section 1103(a)(1) may limit
42

Maniace v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, 40 F.3d 264 (8th Cir. 1994);
Herman v. NationsBank Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1997).
43
40 F.3d at 267.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
126 F.3d at 1361.
47
Id. The court does seem to hedge a little here by including the language “in
accordance with . . . ERISA’s requirements.” This suggests that when the directions
are improper under ERISA, a directed trustee may have a duty to take some action.
48
FirsTier Bank, N.A. v. Zeller, 16 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1994); In re WorldCom,
Inc. ERISA Litig., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
49
Zeller, 16 F.3d at 911. The Maniace court distinguished FirsTier by arguing
that the trustee in FirsTier did in fact have “general fiduciary responsibility for
management of all plan assets,” and thus was not truly a directed trustee. Maniace,
40 F.3d at 268.
50
Id.
51
263 F. Supp. 2d at 762.
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the scope of a directed trustees duty, it does not “eliminate the
fiduciary status or duties that normally adhere to a trustee with
responsibility over ERISA assets.”52 More recently, the district court
for the Southern District of Texas held in In re Enron Corporation
Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation53 that although the scope of
a directed trustee’s authority and discretion over plan assets is limited,
“[a]t least some fiduciary status and duties of a directed trustee are
preserved.”54
II. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR FIELD ASSISTANCE BULLETIN NO.
2004-03
The United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) “promotes the
welfare of the job seekers, wage earners, and retirees of the United
States” in part by “protecting their retirement and health care
benefits.”55 The DOL’s Employee Benefits Security Administration is
responsible for administering and enforcing the provisions of ERISA
that protect participants of employee benefit plans and their
beneficiaries.56 Acting under that responsibility, the DOL issued Field
Assistance Bulletin No. 2004-03 on December 17, 2004 (the
“Bulletin”),57 which attempted to clarify the scope of a directed
trustee’s fiduciary duties.58
The Bulletin provides general guidance on the Department of
Labor’s “views on the responsibilities of directed trustees under
ERISA, particularly with respect to directions involving employer
52

Id.
284 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
54
Id. at 601.
55
U.S. Department of Labor in the 21st Century.
http://www.dol.gov/opa/aboutdol/mission.htm (last visited November 23, 2006).
56
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/index.htm (last visited November
23, 2006).
57
“Fiduciary Responsibilities of Directed Trustees” (U.S. Department of Labor
Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2004-03, Dec. 17, 2004).
58
Id.
53
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securities.”59 After briefly examining the relevant ERISA provisions,
the Bulletin discusses the extent to which a directed trustee is
obligated to question the named fiduciary’s instructions and determine
whether those instructions are prudent and thus acceptable under
ERISA.60
The Bulletin first recognizes that the fiduciary duties of a directed
trustee are “significantly narrower” than the duties ascribed to other
fiduciaries.61 In reaching its conclusion, the DOL acknowledges that it
is a plan’s named fiduciary who determines whether a particular
transaction is prudent, and not the directed trustee.62 Therefore the
scope of a directed trustee’s responsibility is necessarily limited.63
Thus, according to the DOL, a “directed trustee does not have an
obligation to duplicate or second-guess the work of plan fiduciaries.”64
But, relying primarily on the Enron and WorldCom decisions
discussed above, the Bulletin does suggest that directed trustees do
maintain some limited duty of prudence.65
According to the DOL – and consistent with ERISA – this limited
duty of prudence is violated “when a directed trustee knows or should
know that a direction from a named fiduciary . . . is contrary to
ERISA.”66 As noted above, a directed trustee is not obliged to secondguess the decisions made by named fiduciaries.67 However, the
Bulletin announced two specific situations where the duty of prudence
may obligate a directed trustee to act.68 This could occur when a
directed trustee knows of: (1) “material non-public information
59

Id. at 1.
Id. at 1-6.
61
Id. at 2.
62
Id. at 4.
63
Id. at 2, 4.
64
Id. (citing Herman v. NationsBank Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354, 1361-62 (11th
Cir. 1997)).
65
Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2004-03 at 2.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 4.
68
Id. at 4-6.
60
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regarding a security”69 or (2) material public information regarding a
security70 that suggests a direction is imprudent.
A. Directed Trustees’ Duty To Act on Private Information
A directed trustee must inquire about the named fiduciary’s
knowledge and consideration of “material non public information that
is necessary for a prudent decision,” before following any direction by
the named fiduciary “that would be affected by such information.”71
The Department provides an example:
[I]f a directed trustee has non-public information
indicating that a company’s public financial statements
contain material misrepresentations that significantly
inflate the company’s earnings, the trustee could not
simply follow a direction to purchase that company’s
stock at an artificially inflated price . . . the directed
trustee, prior to following [that] direction . . . has a duty
. . . to inquire about the named fiduciary’s knowledge
and consideration of the information with respect to the
direction.72
This suggests that if a directed trustee fails to question the named
fiduciary and simply follows a direction despite having knowledge of
pertinent non-public information, that trustee would likely be in breach
of its fiduciary duty of prudence under ERISA.
B. Directed Trustees Duty To Act On Public Information
The DOL views the directed trustees’ duty to question the named
fiduciary’s direction in light of public information in a different
69

Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
71
Id. at 4.
72
Id.
70
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manner.73 Only in “limited, extraordinary circumstances, where there
are clear and compelling public indicators” might a directed trustee
have to inquire about the named fiduciary’s direction before acting.74
According to the Bulletin, examples of such extraordinary
circumstances are “an 8-K filing75 with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, a bankruptcy filing, or a similar public indicator that
call[s] into serious question a company’s viability.”76
Thus, with respect to public information, the Bulletin suggests
that in the face of these extraordinary circumstances, a directed trustee
would be in breach of its fiduciary duty of prudence were it to follow
through on a direction from a named fiduciary without further inquiry
into the situation.77
As the district court for the Eastern District of Virginia recently
stated in DiFelice v. U.S. Airways,78 in the context of ERISA, “the
DOL’s interpretation is especially worthy of deference.” 79
73

Id. at 5. The DOL gives three reasons to support the distinction between
public and non-public information. First, it assumes that markets are efficient and
that stock prices reflect publicly available information and known risks. Second,
with respect to employer securities, securities law places obligations on the
company, along with its officers and accountants to accurately report their financial
records. Third, ERISA § 404 requires that the named fiduciary adheres to a stringent
standard of care when directing trustees. Id. at 5.
74
Id. at 5-6.
75
See infra note 99. Public companies file 8-K reports “to announce major
events that shareholders should know about.”
76
Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2004-03 at 5-6.
77
Id. at 6. This suggests that blindly following directions which, in the face of
such circumstances, appear imprudent, is a breach of the directed trustees duty of
prudence.
78
397 F. Supp. 2d 735 (E.D. Va. 2005).
79
Id. at 752 n.25. The court stated that
The DOL’s interpretation of ERISA . . . is nonetheless entitled to
deference depending upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all of those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control . . . deference
is especially appropriate where the regulatory scheme is highly
detailed and the agency can bring the benefit of specialized
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Unfortunately for the plaintiffs in Summers, the Seventh Circuit chose
to limit its application of the Bulletin, leading to what was ultimately
an inequitable result.80
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN
SUMMERS V. STATE STREET BANK & TRUST CO.
When United filed for bankruptcy at the end of 2002, its
employees – both current and former – owned more than half of the
company’s common stock through their participation in United’s
ESOP (the “Plan”).81 Plaintiffs in Summers were a class of those
employees who participated in that Plan.82 By August of 2002, the
Plan held close to 58 million shares of United common stock.83
Plaintiffs brought suit against State Street Bank and Trust
Company, the Plan’s directed trustee, alleging imprudent
management.84 Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that State Street
breached its fiduciary duty or prudence under ERISA by maintaining
all of the Plan’s assets in United stock when it knew that the Company
faced extreme financial problems and a potential bankruptcy.85

experience to bear on the subtle questions in a particular case . . .
In the case of ERISA, the DOL’s interpretation is especially
worthy of deference.
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
80
See Summers v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 453 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2006).
81
Id. at 405. Plaintiffs were participants in the Plan from November 17, 2001
through June 30, 2003.
82
Id.
83
Plaintiffs-Appellants’, Cross-Appellees’ Brief and Short Appendix in Case
No. 05-4005, 2005 WL 3749800 (7th Cir. 2006).
84
Summers, 453 F.3d at 405-06.
85
Brief for 2005 WL 3749800 at 3
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A. The Plan
The Plan named the UAL Corporation ESOP Committee (the
“Committee”) as the only named fiduciary.86 According to the Plan, it
was the Committee’s job “to establish an investment policy and
objective for the Plan.”87 However, “it [was] understood that the Plan
[was] designed to invest exclusively in [United] stock.”88 The
Committee established a policy that did just that.89
Pursuant to the Plan, the Committee retained the ability to
“delegat[e] the power to manage or control the assets of the Trust
Fund,” and thus appointed the State Street Bank & Trust Company
(“State Street”) as the Plan’s trustee.90 Consistent with the Plan’s
language, State Street was instructed to invest exclusively in United
Stock, making State Street a directed trustee.91
B. United Airlines’ Stock Price Tumbles
United was in serious financial trouble by the summer of 2001.92
According to documents that United filed with the SEC in the year
2000, the airlines’ financial outlook for the following year was

86

Summers, 453 F.3d at 405. The Committee was made up of six members:
three were appointed by the Air Line Pilots Association, two were appointed by the
International Association of Machinists, and one was appointed by United.
Plaintiffs-Appellants’, Cross-Appellees’ Brief and Short Appendix in Case No. 054005, 2005 WL 3749800, at *9 (7th Cir. 2006).
87
Summers, 453 F.3d at 405.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.; Plaintiffs-Appellants’, Cross-Appellees’ Brief and Short Appendix in
Case No. 05-4005, 2005 WL 3749800, at *9 (7th Cir. 2006).
91
Summers, 453 F.3d at 405-06. “State Street is what is called a ‘directed’
trustee, because the Committee (the fiduciary named in the Plan), in accordance with
the plan language . . . directed State Street to invest the ESOP’s assets exclusively in
stock of United Air Lines.” Id.
92
Id. at 407.
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“poor.”93 This bleak projection was based in part on an increase fuel
costs and an overall decrease in travel.94 As a result, United reported
operational losses of nearly $900 million in the first six months of
2001.95 Shares of United Stock dropped from $50 per share to $30.82
by September 10, 2001.96
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 accelerated the
dramatic drop in the share price of United stock.97 On September 17,
the first day that the New York Stock Exchange resumed trading after
the attacks, the stock closed at $17.50.98
On October 17, 2001, Jim Goodwin, then CEO of United, wrote a
letter to the company’s employees.99 The letter articulated the dire
financial situation that United was facing:
In the wake of [the September 11th terrorist attacks],
we are in nothing less than a fight for our life. Never in
our 75-year history have we faced an economic
challenge of this magnitude, where the drop-off in air
travel has been so unexpected and prolonged. Our
number one priority now is to get United into a
financial position that will allow us to continue
operating . . . In the past, we struggled to make a profit.
Now we're in a struggle just to survive . . . Today, we
are literally hemorrhaging money. Clearly, this bleeding
has to be stopped – and soon – or United will perish
sometime next year.100
93

Plaintiffs-Appellants’, Cross-Appellees’ Brief and Short Appendix in Case
No. 05-4005, 2005 WL 3749800, at *11 (7th Cir. 2006).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. The letter, which was addressed to all company employees, was filed
with the Securities Exchange Commission as an “8-K report.” Public companies file
8-K reports to announce major events that are of interest to shareholders.
100
Id. at *12.
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The stock price fell an additional twenty percent in the days
immediately following the publication of the letter.101 In light of these
events, Business Week reported that bankruptcy was likely UAL’s
“only hope.”102
C. State Street Bank & Trust Company’s Response
As the Plan’s directed trustee, State Street was in charge of
managing the Plan’s assets.103 As the price of United stock continued
to fall, and the financial press began to speculate as to United’s
potential bankruptcy, State Street became concerned.104 Therefore
State Street employed CitiStreet, an employee benefits service
provider, to monitor United stock.105
CitiStreet put United stock on its “watch list”106 in December of
2001, where it remained through September of 2002.107 On August 15,
2002, more than eight months after United stock was first placed on
CitiStreet’s watchlist, and almost an entire year after Goodwin’s letter,
State Street informed the Committee that it may be imprudent for the
Plan to continue to maintain its exclusive holdings of UAL stock.108
In response to this warning, the Committee appointed State Street
as the plan’s investment manager, which authorized State Street to

101

Summers v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 453 F.3d 404, 407-08 (7th Cir.

2006).
102

Plaintiffs-Appellants’, Cross-Appellees’ Brief and Short Appendix in Case
No. 05-4005, 2005 WL 3749800, at *13 (7th Cir. 2006).
103
Summers, 453 F.3d at 405.
104
Id. at 408
105
Plaintiffs-Appellants’, Cross-Appellees’ Brief and Short Appendix in Case
No. 05-4005, 2005 WL 3749800, at *16 (7th Cir. 2006).
106
This allowed CitiStreet to closely monitor the stock’s performance.
107
Plaintiffs-Appellants’, Cross-Appellees’ Brief and Short Appendix in Case
No. 05-4005, 2005 WL 3749800, at *16 (7th Cir. 2006).
108
Summers, 453 F.3d at 408.
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divest the Plan of its United stock and diversify its holdings.109 After
determining that continuing with the Plan’s policy of exclusively
holding and investing in United stock was inconsistent with ERISA
under the circumstances, State Street began to sell shares of United
stock on September 27, 2002.110 That afternoon, the stock closed at
$2.36 per share.111 Based on the September 10, 2001 closing price, the
roughly 58 million shares of United stock that were being held in the
plan lost more than $1.5 billion between the attacks of September 11th
and sell-off date over a year later.112
D. Judge Posner’s Decision
In Summers, the Seventh Circuit113 first had to determine whether,
as a directed trustee, State Street had a “fiduciary duty with respect to
the trust assets, specifically any duty ever to replace the employer’s
stock . . . with some other security.”114 Essentially, the court had to
decide whether a directed trustee has a duty of prudence; i.e., whether
there can ever be a situation where a directed trustee is not required to
follow a direction from a named fiduciary because the direction is
improper under ERISA.115
As discussed above in part I.D, while some federal courts have
held that a directed trustee is simply not a plan fiduciary and therefore
does not have a duty of prudence,116 others have reached an opposite
conclusion, holding that ERISA does impose a duty of prudence –
109

Id.; Plaintiffs-Appellants’, Cross-Appellees’ Brief and Short Appendix in
Case No. 05-4005, 2005 WL 3749800, at *18 (7th Cir. 2006).
110
Plaintiffs-Appellants’, Cross-Appellees’ Brief and Short Appendix in Case
No. 05-4005, 2005 WL 3749800, at *18 (7th Cir. 2006).
111
Summers, 453 F.3d at 408.
112
58,000,000 shares, multiplied by a loss of $28.46 per share, works out to a
total loss of $1,650,680,000.
113
A 3-judge panel of Judge Posner, Judge Wood, and Judge Evans heard the
case; Judge Posner wrote the unanimous opinion.
114
Summers, 453 F.3d at 406.
115
Id. at 406-07.
116
See supra note 42.
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although possibly a somewhat limited duty – on directed trustees.117
The Summers court recognized this, and after blaming the confusion
on the “confusing statutory picture” that ERISA creates, the court
turned to the DOL Bulletin.118
On this issue, the court followed the Bulletin’s guidance.
According to Judge Posner, the Bulletin affirmed that a directed
trustee does in fact have a duty of prudence.119 The court reasoned that
a directed trustee controls the trust assets, and therefore if the trustee
were to follow an instruction whereby it is knowingly investing the
assets imprudently or allowing them to remain imprudently invested, it
would be a breach of that duty.120 Therefore, the court held that
ERISA “expressly imposes the duty of prudence on directed trustees
and forbids them to comply with directions that are not ‘proper.’”121
This determination is consistent with the language of ERISA,
which requires directed trustees to follow “proper directions” which
are consistent with the Act.122 However, it is in the application of this
determination that the Summers decision appears to part from both the
DOL Bulletin and ERISA.
As noted above, the plaintiffs in Summers argued that as a
directed trustee, State Street violated its fiduciary duty of prudence by
failing to sell the United stock held by the ESOP until just before
United filed for bankruptcy.123 According to the plaintiffs, both
former-CEO Goodwin’s letter and the falling stock price should have
indicated to State Street that “United was going into the tank.”124
That, plaintiffs argued, should have been enough to cause State Street

117

See supra note 48
Summers, 453 F.3d at 406-07.
119
Id. at 406.
120
Id. at 407.
121
Id. Interestingly, the decision does not reflect any argument on behalf of
State Street that such a duty of prudence does not or should not attach.
122
29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1).
123
Summers, 453 F.3d at 405.
124
Id. at 408.
118
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to begin to divest the Plan of United stock.125 Judge Posner, however,
disagreed. In his opinion, the market – shares of United stock were
traded on the New York Stock Exchange – provided the best indicator
of value, and even after the Goodwin letter was made public, United
stock was still trading at $15.05 per share.126 Therefore, according to
Judge Posner, it was not imprudent for State Street to assume that the
market was correct,127 and State Street was thus not required to act
based on an assumption that the market was overvaluing United.128
Ultimately, according to Judge Posner, plaintiffs claim failed
because of what he referred to as “a failure of proof.”129 However, he
urged the plaintiffs to take comfort in knowing “that determining the
‘right’ point, or even range of ‘right’ points, for an ESOP fiduciary to
break the plan and start diversifying may be beyond the practical
capacity of the courts to determine.130 Here, it appears that Judge
Posner may be incorrect, as it seems that DOL Bulletin established the
point where a directed trustee should “break the plan” and start
diversifying.131
Recall from above that according to the DOL’s interpretation of
ERISA, there may come a time when a directed trustee has a duty,
based on public information, not to follow the named fiduciary’s
direction.132 According to the DOL Bulletin, examples of such
“extraordinary circumstances” which, in Posner’s words, would be the
“right point . . . for an ESOP fiduciary to break the plan and start

125

Id. at 407-08.
Id. at 408.
127
Id. In fact, according to Judge Posner, “it would be hubris for a trust
company like state street to think it could predict United’s future more accurately
than the market could.” Id. (emphasis in original).
128
Id.
129
Id. at 411.
130
Id.
131
See Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2004-03 at 4-6.
132
Id. at 5-6.
126
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diversifying”133 are an 8-K filing with the SEC, or a “similar public
indicator that [calls] into serious question a company’s viability.”134
Former-CEO Goodwin’s October 2001 letter acted as an example
of both. Not only was the letter filed with the SEC as an 8-K, the
language of letter specifically called into question United’s future.135
Goodwin ended the letter by stating “this bleeding has to be stopped –
and soon – or United will perish sometime next year.”136 Such
language, especially considering that it was coming from United’s
CEO would appear to call “into serious question [the] company’s
viability.”137 Judge Posner, however, disagreed; he relied on the idea
that the market, and not Goodwin’s letter, should be the measure by
which United’s viability was determined.138
While economically this may be a sound argument, its result is
simply inequitable. Judge Posner is willing to wait for the market to
indicate that United is doomed to a fate of bankruptcy while the
participating employees watch the value of their retirement income
steadily and consistently decrease.139 The DOL Bulletin’s
interpretation of the relevant ERISA provisions provides a route to an
adequate remedy, and the court should have provided it.

133

Id.
Id.
135
Plaintiffs-Appellants’, Cross-Appellees’ Brief and Short Appendix in Case
No. 05-4005, 2005 WL 3749800, at *11-12 (7th Cir. 2006).
136
Id. at *12.
137
Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2004-03 at 6. In a footnote, the Bulletin
indicates that “[a] directed trustee’s actual knowledge of media or other public
reports or analyses that merely speculate on the continued viability of a company
does not, in and of itself, constitute knowledge of clear and compelling evidence
concerning the company sufficient to give rise to a directed trustee’s duty to act.”
However, the indicators in Summers were more than mere speculation.
138
Summers v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 453 F.3d 404, 408 (7th Cir. 2006).
139
Judge Posner does, however, make an interesting and rather persuasive
argument based on risk and how the decrease in the price of United stock increased
the risk in plaintiffs participation in the plan. Id. at 408-11. However, this is a
different argument for a different article.
134
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Judge Posner reasons that the use of the word “may” by the DOL
creates a standard that is not administrable.140 This, however, amounts
to nothing more that placing form over substance. Notwithstanding
the use of “may” as opposed to “should” or “must,” the DOL Bulletin
is clear in its intent. In certain limited, “extraordinary circumstances,”
a directed trustee needs to do more than blindly follow instructions.141
When such circumstances are present, continued compliance is
imprudent, and therefore in violation of ERISA’s requirement that
directed trustees only follow instructions that are proper under the Act.
State Street’s continued compliance with the Committee’s
direction in the year after September 11, 2001 amounted to a breach of
its fiduciary duty of prudence. As the price of United stock continued
to fall, State Street had a duty under ERISA to take act before
continuing to follow the Committee’s directions. By failing to do so,
and by holding onto United stock, State Street breached that duty, and
therefore it should have been held liable in Summers.
IV. CONCLUSION
Near the end of his opinion Judge Posner suggests that perhaps
the time has come for Congress to rethink the concept of ESOPs.142 An
ESOP is, he argues, a “seemingly inefficient method of wealth
accumulation by employees,” mostly because it inherently lacks
diversification.143 Moreover, the evidence “that having a stake in one’s
employer will induce one to be more productive” is “weak and makes
no theoretical sense.”144

140

Id. at 411.
Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2004-03 at 5-6.
142
Summers, 453 F.3d at 411.
143
Id.
144
Id. (citing “Motivating Employees with Stock and Involvement,” NBER
Website, http://www.nber.org/digest/may04/w10177.html; Joseph Blasi, Michael
Conte & Douglas Kruse, Employee Stock Ownership and Corporate Performance
Among Public Companies, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 60 (1996)).
141
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However, whether ESOPs may or may not be a good idea for
either employers or employees, they continue to exist.145 And, as long
as ESOPs continue to exist, it is the duty of the federal courts to
interpret the provisions that regulate them in a manner that is
consistent with ERISA. In Summers, the Seventh Circuit failed to
fulfill that duty.
Congress enacted ERISA to ensure that when an employee
participating in an employee benefit plan was promised a benefit, the
employee would receive that benefit.146 That goal was not achieved in
Summers. The plaintiffs participated in United’s ESOP expecting that
they would receive a benefit, yet that benefit was ultimately never
received.147 Consistent with ERISA, in this type of situation, it is the
role of the courts to protect employees like the plaintiffs in Summers.
However, the Seventh Circuit failed to protect thousands of current
and former United employees from the State Street’s inaction, inaction
that was imprudent and contrary to its fiduciary duty under ERISA.
This result could have been avoided had the Seventh Circuit
properly applied the standard expressed in the DOL Bulletin. In the
face of specific, public indications of the types of “extraordinary
circumstances” that the Bulletin outlined, the court should have held
that State Street violated its fiduciary duty of prudence by continuing
to follow the Committee’s improper directions and failing to take
action. Diversification of the Plan’s assets was the only prudent course
of action.

145

And, as noted above, participation in ESOPs does not appear to be slowing
down. See supra note 2.
146
See supra note 25.
147
Summers, 453 F.3d at 411.
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